RECONCILIATION WITH FINITUDE:
NARRA TlVE SELFHOOD IN KIERKEGAARD'S EITHER/OR

Eli Simmons
S0ren Kierkegaard's authorship is notoriously enigmatic. Writing under a long list of pseudonyms, and speaking
in a variety of voices that articulate competing world views and
philosophical perspectives, Kierkegaard escapes any easy categorization (as, for instance , the "father of existentialism").
Wbile this authorial compl exity can serv e as a stumbling block
to some , it has led to the proliferation of a robust and interpretively diverse body of scholarly conversations. One such
sc holarly conversation that has developed in the contemporary
literature approaches Kierkegaard's authorship narratologically , engaging his texts through the lens of questions relating
to narrative identity and self-interpretation. Scholars such as
Joakim Garff, K. Brian Soderquist , and John J. Davenport
each take thi s narratological and hermeneutical approach in
their own distinctiv e ways . Against the background of this
burgeoning field of Kierkegaard scholarship, I will take a narrative approach to Kierkegaard's corpus in the following paper , focusing primarily on Either/Or (I 843) and the theory of
narrative selfhood developed therein.
The papers of the pseudonymous "Judge Wilhelm "
that compose the second part of Either/Or offer a kind of
roadmap for the task of selfhood, the task with which Kierkegaard is so singularly concerned throughout his authorship.
Especially in his second letter, which Victor Eremita - the
pseudonymous "editor" of Either/Or-has entitled "Eq uilibrium Betwee n the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Development of Personality," Wilhelm details the various moves one
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must make and the various interior stages one must undergo in
order to "win what is the main thing in life": one's self. 1 What
then are these movements and these stages? How does Wilhelm understand the process by which a human being is able
to become the self that she is?
Of course , there are many angles from which one
might approach Kierkegaard's text to wrest from it responses
to these questions and others like them. And indeed, as much
recent Kierkegaard scho larship has demonstrated , it is hardly
a simple task to pin down with precision any clear and consistent philosophical po ition s in the polyphony of voices that
speak out from the pseudonymous authorship. Kierkegaard 's
texts - Either/Or included - are hermeneutically demanding,
abounding with a semantic surp lus that calls for constant interpr tive vigilanc .2 As Joakim Garff rightly notes, "The plurality of voices , pens, positions, and lit rary jokers - which are
also present in the mo t philosophical part of the work (the
Fragments and Postscript nee ss itate a nev r resting attentivenes on b half of th r ader. The r ad r must hav a dual
view, which not only grasps what Ki rk gaard writes, but also
how he write what he writes." With the hermeneutic complexity of K.ierk gaard's authorsh ip in mind, this pap r does
not pret nd to captur the full scope of what is going on in
Wilhelm's letters. In tead, thi s ay will provide one angle
one might take when approaching Wilhelm roadmap, an ang le I will argu provide rich insight into the structure of human selfhood as With Im sees it and as it appears elsewher

1 S0ren Kierkegaard, Either / Or: A Fragm ent of life, Translated by
Alastair Hannay, (London: Penguin Books 2004), 482.
2 For deconstructive readings of EitheJ/Or that are attentive to the
implications of this hermen utic complexity, see E lsebet Jegstrnp's
The New Kierkegaard (2004, p. 14-87).
3 Joakim Garff, "'The Esthetic is Above All My E lement"', The
New Kierkegaard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004),
69.
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throughout the authorship, despite this angle's inevitabl e hermeneutical limitations.
In the following paper, l will offer an account ofWilhelm 's conception of selfhood and narrative identity as this
conception appears in the second part of Either/ Or, specifically in Wilhelm's second letter, "Eq uilibrium Between the
Aesthetic and the Ethical." I will seek to illuminate the
roadmap to which I gestured above, paying particularly close
attention to the way in which Wilhelm understands the role of
finitude and situatedness in the makeup of the human self.
Thus, drawing upon other parts of the authorship--specifically The Sickness unto Death (1849) and The Concept of
irony (1841 )-1 will begin by offering a brief account of one
way in which Kierkegaard seems to think that the individual
can fail in the task of selfhood by not being properly attuned
to the finite and concrete elements of the self that are outside
of the individual's control. Having introduced this existential
"wrong tum," l will then tum to Wilhelm's letter to examine
his account of selfhood. Ultimately, I will argue that Wilhelm s roadmap offers a way back from this existential wrong
tum, leading the human being into reconciliation with her
finitude and all that it implies, equipping her to come into
alignment with herself as the particular, concrete, finite self
that she is.

1.2 The Wrong Turn
In the opening paragraph of The Sickness unto Death,
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Anti-Climacus describes
the human being as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite,
of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." 4 ln
other words, similar to Jean-Paul Sartre's categories of transcendence and facticity (though dissimilar in important

S0ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death , Translated by
Alastair Hannay, (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 43.

4
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ways),5 a human being is not just freedom, will, or imagination
(the infinite), but is also embodied culturally and historically
situated, intersubjectively determined and socially embedded
(the finite).
In many ways, this formula serves as the background
against which Kierkegaard thinks through selfhood throughout his authorship. One way Kierkegaard seems to think the
human being fails in the task of selfhood is by failing to bring
these two dialectical poles of his existence into alignment, by
overemphasizing the infinite part of the dialectic to the denial
of the finite. In other words, the human being chooses to
downplay or ignore all of the parts of himself that are outside
of his control - his particular lived body, his unchosen national identity his concrete personal history, his familial entanglements, and so on- in order to magnify his existential
freedom to shape and determine his own identity. This rejection of actuality, the rejection of one's concrete situatedness,
results for Kierkegaard in a profound existential discontinuity.
The self, having rejected one side of the dialectic of existence,
becomes lost in its imaginative power of self-interpretation,
distanced from its concrete existential situation. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard examines this phenomenon under the guise of defiant despair, in The Concept of Irony , under
the guise ofromantic irony, and in Either/Or, through the character of Aesthete A. We will look briefly at these three examples in order to establish the existential illness to which Judge
Wilhelm provides a possible remedy.

2.1 Defiant Despair
Though his nosology of spiritual ailments includes a
variety of types of despair, we are concerned here with what
Anti-Climacus calls "defiant despair." Defiant despair is the
kind of wrong tum just described whereby the human being,
For more on the relationship betwe n Kierkegaard's and Sartre's
ideas on transcendence and facticity, see Pattison I 997, 80-84.
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losing sight of the actuality that puts up resistance to his existential freedom , overemphasizes his freedom to create and interpret his own existence according to hi whims and desires.
Anti-Climacus describes this kind of despair as follows:
The self want in despair to rule over himself , or create himself, make this self the self he wants to be, detennine what he will have and what he will not have
in his concrete self His concrete self, or his concreteness, has indeed necessity and limits , is this quite definite thing, with these aptitudes, predispositions, etc.,
in this concrete set of circumstances etc. But by
means of the infinite fonn, the negative self, h wants
first to refashion the whole thing in order to get out of
it a self such as he wants , produced by means of the
infinite fo1m of th negative self- and it i in this way
he wants to b himself. 6
Thus the self in defiant de pair rejects its concretenes and it
finite situatedness while over mphasizing its powers of imaginative self-interpretation . The self wants to tell a new and
original story about itself and wants to be able to retell thi
story at a moment's notice with fresh details. How ver, for
Anti- limacus such an existential orientation results ultimately in a loss of existential continuity for "just when [the
self] eems on the point of having the building finished, at a
whim it can dissolve the whole thing into nothing." 7 As K.
Brian Soderquist puts it such a self, whose narrative identity
dissolves ultimately into a fiction, is haunted by the possibility of starting all over again with a new interpretation. ' 8 In the
end, like a stage actor for whom after many years the bounda-

6

SUD, 99.

[bid., 10 I.
K. Brian Soderquist, "Authoring a Self', Kierkegaard Studies
Yearbook (2009), 153.

7
8
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ties between self and role have disturbingly dissolved, the despairing self can no longer recognize the true from the fictional
self-narrative. Such an individual, lacking even the semblance
of internal continuity, becomes incomprehensible to himself,
"an enigma" and mere mystification. 9 The despairing selfs
given, concrete self has disappeared into its "fictional, masterly project , its own way of understanding itself." 10
2.2 The Romantic Ironist
Jn The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard examines the
same type of exi tential misalignment Anti-Climacus describes as defiant despair through an examination and critique
of romantic irony. 11 In the doctoral thesis, alongside and
through a sustained engagement with the thought of I 9th century German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, Kierkegaard decries
the Gennan Romanticism fashionable at the time (exemplified
by Schlegel, Tieck, and the like) for its ironic detachment from
concrete, historical actuality:

As irony contrives to overcome historical actuality by
making it hover, so irony itself has in tum become
hovering. Its actuality is sheer possibility. In order for
the acting individual to be able to fulfil his task in realizing actuality, he must feel himself assimilated into
a larger context, must feel the seriousness of responsibility, must feel and respect every rational consequence. But irony is free from all this. It knows itself

EO, 47.
101.
11 For a more nuanced analysis of these ideas as they appear in
Kierkegaard's dissertation, see K. Brian S6derquist's The Isolated

9

10 SUD,

Self: Tnith and Untruth in S@renKierkegaard 's On the Concept of
Irony (2007).
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to be in possession of the power to begin from the beginning whenever it pleases, for nothing in the past is
binding upon it. 12
Just as the self in defiant despair, the romantic ironi t wants to
take full control of his own narrative identity, and thus denies
the concrete facticity - his own historical actuality his pastthat would put up resistance to his own self-understanding.
But in the end, the story such an ironist tells to him elf about
him self is unbelievable, for the ironist is always conscious of
his ability to strut all over again from the beginning at any
point. The ties that bind the ironist to the finite are clipped,
eliminating the limitations that actuality establishes in relation
to self-narrative. Again as Soderquist notes , the romantics
'deny one side of the dialectic of human existence the finite
side that we share with everything in the natural word, while
affi1ming our own power to transcend the finite via imagination.13 The Aesthete of Either/Or is guilty of the same, and it
is to him that we will now tum before turning to the papers of
his counterpart.

2.3 Aesthete A
Aesthete A like his philosophical kindred spirits described above, holds at a distance from himself the actuality or
facticity that could serve as the limiting horizons upon the infinitude of his existential freedom and upon his aesthetic selfinterpretation; he denies the finite and the situated in favor of
the infinite and the imaginative. Much of A's papers are concerned with the phenomenon of memory, and with the accompanying phenomena of remembering and forgetting, and here
his denial of actuality rears its head. A, like the despairing self
of Sickness unto Death, "wants in its despair to savour to the
full the satisfaction of making itself into itself, of developing
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itself, of being itself." 14 For this reason, he makes an art fonn
of remembering and forgetting, whereby his factical history
becomes an infinitely malleable fictional narrative that he can
weave and reweave to fit his variable aesthetic disposition. For
A, "one must.. .constantly vary oneself," 15 but A is interested
more in varying one's own self-interpretation ("intensive" variation) than in varying one's life situation ("extensive" varia tion), though the latter has an importance of its own .16 On account of this aesthetic existential orientation, A hovers above
himse.lf, becomes a spectator to his own existence, loses any
sense of textured factical connection to the shared intersubjective lifeworld or to hi own ·given set of contingent, histoiical
circumstances . Tn developing the art of remembering and forgetting, A thus also develops a way of living whereby he
avoids ever being fully entrenched in or bound to his present
experience, for to be fully present is to draw near to the world
that A must hold at an infinite aesthetic distance from his self:
Being able to forget depends always on how one remembers , but how one remembers depends in turn on
how one experiences reality ... Every life-situation
must possess no more importance than that one can
forget it whenever one wants to; each single life situation should have enough importance, however, for
one to be able at any time to remember it. .. Having
perfected the art of forgetting and the art of remembering, one is then in a position to play battledore and
shuttlecock with the whole of existence. 17
2.4 Ex istentia l M isa lignment

SUD, 101.
239.
16 Ibid., 233.
17 Ibid., 234 .
14

15 EO,
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A, the elf in defiant despair, and the romantic ironist all represent to various degrees a reoccurring Kierkegaardian theme:
the existential chaos, incoherence , discontinuity and misalignment that inevitably result from not properly attending to
one s "giv n self, ' 18 to the 'larger context' into \J hich on is
thrown and from which one cannot extract one 's self 19 to the
actuality facticity, and the concr te reality that define one's
situated existence as an embodi d individual and delineat rhe
limitations upon one' powers of self-interpretation. In his dissertation, Kierkegaard says of the ironist what could al o be
said of A or the despairing self: "Beca use the ironist poetically
produces himself as well as his environment with the greatest
possible poetic license , becaus e he lives completely hypothetically and ubjuncti ely , his lifi finally loses all continuity." -0
Loss of internal continuity is th inevitable outcome of the existential wrong tum I have outlined above . To follow A sthete
A in hi denial of the demands of actuality, "to not merely
think and speak aphoristically but live aphoristically ," 2 1 is to
lose coherence or continuity as a self, for in this way one is not
bound to any self-interpretation outside of the stories one tells
oneself about oneself. And th se stor ies are, in the final analysis unb lievable for the moment the story is told , the self
'can di solve the whole thing into nothing " and start again. 22
We have thus shed light on the exi tential wrong tum
by which the existing individual fails in the task of selfhood
by denying one side of the dial ctic of his existence: finitude.
How then can one return from this existentia l wrong tum? For
an answer to this question , we tum to the second part of Either/O r and to Wilhelms papers.

3.0 The Papers of B
18

19

SUD, 99.
CJ, 296.

20

Ibid., 30 I.

21

£0, 212.

22 SUD

IOI.
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In his papers, Judge Wilhelm establishes his theory of ethical
elfhood a theory which attributes central importance to
choice- Sp cifically to choosing oneself. For Wilhelm, selfhood begins in the act of ethical choice through which the individual chooses himself absolutely and thus takes responsibility for very element and aspect of his existence, the chosen
and the contingent alike. Due to the brevity of this paper, I will
not consider all of the dimensions of Wilhelm's account of
ethical self -choice. Jnstead, I wi ll focus here on Wilhelm's account of reconci liation, ith finitude and the existential continuity that results from this movement. Havin g ethically chosen
oneself in one's' eterna l validity, 23 how does Wilhelm think
th human being can become reconciled to the finit pole of
her exi tence? Furthermore , how doe s such a reconciliation
bring about an interior continuity that Wilhelm believes A
lacks? What might self- interpretation look like in the wake of
these existential movements?
3.1 Repentance into Finitude

For Wilhelm, one essential element of eth ical se lfcho ice is the movement by which the individual takes responibility not only for what he feels he has chosen, but also for
all of those elements of his identity that he has not chosen and
that he can neither control nor interpret away: his particular
' aptitudes and "passio ns,' his body and his "definite sur roundings. '24 The ethical individual doe not want to erase
this concretion' that he himself is but see in it [hi ] task." 25
Furthermore by taking responsibility for his d finit concreteness, for the chosen and the unchosen for both poles of the
dialectic of selfhood, the ethical indi idual takes hold of him-

EO, 516.
Ibid., 542.
25 Ibid. , 545.
23

24
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self a "a diver ely d tennined concretion and chooses himself ther for in re pect of his concretion." 26 One way that
Wilhelm de cribe uch a total and encompassing type of selfchoice is through the idea of repenlance:
[The ethical indjvidual] repents hjmself back into
himself back inlo the family, back into the race, until
he finds himself in God. Only on these terms can he
choose himself and h want no other , for only thus
can he ab olutely choose himself. .. it is only if I
choose myself as guilty that J choose myself absolut ly, if ever my choosing myself absolutely is not to
be identical with creating myself. 27
Whit th re i certainly theological content to Wilhelm's conception of repentance this concept need not be only undertood in traditional theological tenns. In tead, repentance is
th word Wilhelm uses to describe taking hold ofoneself in all
of one contingency and particularity , as 'a diversely determin d concretion 28 and refusing to leave anything out of the
story . Although in the end we do receive our given sel es
from th hand of the eternal God ' according to Wilhelm's
account 29 we start by imp ly choosing to be precise] who we
are wh r we are in our messy and complex particularity. 30

Ibid., 543.
Ibid. 518.
28 Ibid., 547.
29 Ibid., 519.
30 od rqui t notes in an analysis of The Sickness unto Death that,
for Ki rk gaard, "o ne might say that to be grounded in God comes
very clo to being grounded in God' gift of ituatedness" (Soderqui t 20 I 3, p. 7). or Wilhelm , a well a for Anti-Climacus reconciling oneself to one' finitude and situatedness i inextricably
bound up with reconciling oneself to the " power that established '
the elf (SUD, p. 44) the God from whom one receives oneself and
one existential situation as a gift. Though J do not focus on this
26
27
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Wherea A ' looks at himself in his concretion and then distingui hes one thing from another' seeing "one thing as belonging to him acci denta lly and another a belonging essentially" 31 the ethical abolishes this distinction and takes
responsibility for the entire given self preci sely as it is given.
This is why for Wilhelm, one must choose oneself as "guilty,"
because otherwise it is left to the individual to interpret away
those parts of her self or her past for which she would rather
not tak e up respo nsibility. As Agnes Heller puts it, if the individual who does not repentantly choose h rself as guilty 'at
any time does something out of character, he can say that she
has not cho n it. Yet if she repented back into all of her life
contingencie she could never say that she did so mething becaus sh wa determined by this or that, because she has chosen all her contingencies freely . '32 Thu s, the category of guilt
inaugurat s the movement of repentance and dethrones the
aesthetic or ironic individual 's select ive
If-interpretation ,
calling him to take hold of himself in his entirety calling him
to repent himself back into himself as this guilty particular,
existing individual.
Having chosen oneself repentantly under the category
of guilt having chosen oneself as 'this definite individual ,
with these aptitudes these tendencie , the instincts, these
passions, innuenced by these definite surrou ndin gs as this
definite product of a definite outside world '33 one comes into
alignment with the finitude that del ineate th boundaries of

e lem nt of Wilhelm's conception ofseltl1ood h re, and while I believe we can in tructively read his papers apart from their "theo logical" implication , I view these implications as e sential to a robust
enga ge ment with Either/ Or and with l(jerkegaard s thought as a
whole.
31 EO, 550.
32 Agnes H lier, "The Papers ofB as the Mod m Answer to both
Aristotle and Kant "Kie rkegaard Studies Yearbook (2008) 9.
33 EO 542.
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the stories one can tell about oneself. ln choosing himself absolutely, the ethical indjvidual brings the dialectical poles of
his existence towards alignment by freely choosing his own
contingency, his own history, his own situatedness, and he
thereby "assumes responsibility for it all." 34 The ethical individual 'chooses himself as product- and this choice i freedom's choice ' 35 for Wilhelm s eth ical freedom does not denote the aesthetic freedom to produce onese lf, but the freedom
to take up free responsibility for the produced self that one always already is. And it is precisely in this movement of reconciliation to finitude that one comes into "absolute continuity
with the reality one belongs to. '36

3.2 Existential Continuity
Joakim Garff writes that "In rus criticism of the A.esthete's life, Wilhelm highlights repeatedly that he lacks any
continuity in his existenc which consequently remain fragmentary and fails to transfonn itself into a genuine story." 37
That ethical self-choice is the ground upon wruch one can establish an existential and narratological continuity is brought
into relief when Wilhelm writes:
Only when one has taken possession of oneself in the
choice, has attired oneself in ones self, has penetrated
oneself so totally that every movement i att nded by
the consciousness of a re ponsibility for ones If only
then has one hosen on self ethically only then has
one repented onese lf, only then is one concrete, only

lbid., 542.
Ibid., 543
36 Ibid., 541
37 Joakirn Garff, "A Ma ter of Mjrnesis: Kierkegaard and Rica::ur on
arrative Identity Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2015), 312.
34

35
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th n is one, in one's total iso lation in absolute continuity with the reality one belong to. 8
Thu one's life is transformed into a "g nuine story" when one
stops trying to make up a new story, and chooses instead to
take respon ibility for every part of the story one has already
lived- th story of which the self is indeed the "product." 39
Whereas the aesthetic individual looks back upon a disordered
past in which his elf dissolves "into a multitude, ,4o identifying hims If ess ntially with this or that event but refusing to
take respon ibility for the whole, the ethical individual possesses "a hi tory in whic h he acknowledges identity with hims If" and through which he acknowledges that "he is only the
one he i , with this history.',4 1 To imaginatively interpret away
som el m nt of this history, to pick and choose among the
events of this history in order to w rest from it an idealized but
incomplete self-narrative, is to do violence to the continuity
by which the self is able to acknowledge "ident ity with himself.'>42 The e s ntial role of personal history in Wilhelm's account of Ifhood is brought further into relief when he writes
the following:
For the eterna l dignity of man lies in the fact that he
can acquire a history and the divine element in him
lie in the fact that he himself can impart to his history
a continuity ifhe will· for it acquires that not b being
th um of all that has happened to or befa ll n me, but
by being my own work so that even what ha befallen
me is transformed in me and translated from necessity
to freedom. 43
38 £0,

541.
Ibid., 543.
40 Ibid., 479.
41 Ibid., 518.
42 Ibid., 518.
43 Ibid ., 542.
39
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Garff describes the idea latent in this passage this way: ' To
acquire one's own history is the deed,' whereby one transfers
the occurrences of one's past from necessity to 'freedom.'
What fonnerly was the individual's histmy becomes by this
'deed' the individual's personal narrative.' ,44 Thus, historical
and narrative continuity is not something one attains imply
by virtue of having a past, but is itself a product of human will;
it is a product of the free choice by which the indi idual repentantly chooses onese.lf in one's absolute particularity. This
is why Garff notes furt her that 'Human being is thus always
defined by its history, but never utterly determin ed by it.',45
Reconciling ones If to one's finitude and thereby coming into
continuity with one's concrete reality does not mean that one
is simply fre from the work of self-interpretation but it does
mean that self-interpretation cannot be identical with self-creation. To move the dialectical poles ofone's existence towards
alignment is not to magnify the finite to the detriment of the
infinite for this too is a kind of despair - the despair of lacking
infinitude. 46 As Anti-Climacus notes "to become ometh ing
concrete is neither to become finite nor to become infinite for
that, hich is to become concrete is indeed a synthesis. "'7 Thus
in the synthesizing movement of ethjcal self-choice freedom
remains, and s If-interpretation with it, but ethical self-inter pretation possesses responsibilities to its given actuality that
aesthetic self-interpretation rejects.
3.3 Editoria l Respoos ibiUty
Having chosen oneself as a "diversely determined
concretion ," 48 having repented oneself back into oneself in all
Garff2015, 312.
Ibid., 313.
46 S UD 63-65.
47 lbid. 59.
4 £0, 543.
44

45
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of one's finitude and contingency; having thereby come into
alignment with actuality and established a free continuity with
one's determinate history, Wilhelm is cognizant of the fact that
the work of self-interpretation must go on . To recognize and
take hold of one's finitude is not to abolish the narratological
self-interpretation inextricably bound up with human reflexivity and self-consciousness (the infinite pole), but is to establish
its limitations. The limitations within which self-interpretation
thus takes place are the limitations of the given, factical context and the determinate history into which the self is always
already thrown as the finite self that it is. Thus, for Wilhelm,
the distinction between the accidental and the essential elements of one's given self
is not the product of whim, making it look as though
[the ethical individual] had absolute power to make
himself into whatever he wanted. For although the
ethical individual might refer to himself as his own
editor, he is at the same time fully aware of his editorial responsibility to himself, in so far as what he
chooses has a decisive influence on him personally, to
the scheme of things in which he lives, and to God. 49
The idea of "editorial responsibility" establishes the decisive
chasm between Wilhelm's conception of selfhood and that of
defiant despair, the ironist, and the aesthete. For, as Garff puts
it, "Being an editor is to intervene in an already existing
text .' 50 The self is then not its own creator, but the responsible
editor of the concrete, given self that it is . A or the ironist
would like "to begin a little earlier than other people, not at
and with the beginning, but 'in the beginning,'" thus creating
themselves as if they could get outside of life, as if they could
step outside of themselves and mould themselves from a God-

49 Ibid.,
50

551.

Garff 2015, 314.
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like vantage point. 5 1 Wilhelm, on the other hand, starts with
the self as finite, as continuous with a particular history, as
determined by a multitude of factors he cannot control, as
thrown into a context he cannot escape, as "an individual who
has these abilities these passions, the e inclinations , these
habits subject to th s external influences, and who is influenced thus in one direction and thus in another. '52 And it is as
this definite individual, as the ethical self who has chosen himself in all of his particularity, that the self unde1takes the ongoing and infinitely demanding task of self-interpretation,
fully aware of his ineluctable editorial responsibility to the
concrete reality that partially defines him.
To borrow another authorial metaphor from Soderquist, the person who is sensitive to facticity r cognizes that
he is not his own creator; he must indeed as ist in telling a
story about the self, but his role is that of a 'co-author' so to
speak." 53 The elf is not its sole author but writes within and
alongside a text much of the contents of which are fixed by
forces outside of the co-author's control, but which the self
nonetheless freely embraces and accepts, thus translating "necessity to freedom" and taking up responsibility even for what
the self qua co-author did not choo e to write. 54

4.0 Conclus ion

In conclusion, Wilhelm provides in his papers one
way to make sense of selfhood against the backgrow1d of the
existential misalignment that reappears at every stage of Kierkegaard's authorship. The way towards this misalignment is
the rejection of the finite· the way back is the reconciliation
with that which ha been rejected. However it is important to

51 SUD,

99.
552.
53 Soderquist 2009, 158.
54 EO, 542.
52 EO,
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note that in lived experience , these stages are not always discrete and chronologically isolated. Indeed, the structure of Either/Or itself gestures to the possibility that the human subject
is probably always caught up somewhe re between these two
dia lectical stages, moving now in one direction and now in the
other. And if Victor Eremita i right that the papers of A and
B are 'the work of one man" who has "lived through both
kinds of experience" or has "d liberated on both," 55 then these
two existential movements tell the story of a single human self,
and they thu hav both existed or coexist within that self. Rejection of actuality is the condition of the reconci liation which
B outlines, but this latter movement cannot be dogmatically
secured against the former. Reconciliation with finitude remains vulnerable, porously open to the possibility of rejection,
and Wilhelm's confident voice remains haunted by A's Diapsalmata that one could write like marginal notes along the
edges of B s most triumphant turns of phrase. And perhaps,
hidden fi-om the reader 's iew th y are implicitly and invisibly scribbled there, whether cribbled by A or B it doesn't
much matter. After all, they are probably one and the same.

55

Ibid. , 36.
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